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PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON: USING
HEALTHCARE ECONOMICS TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
W. David Ball

*

Abstract
For much of the last seventy-plus years, healthcare providers in the
United States have been paid under the fee-for-service system, where
providers are reimbursed for procedures performed, not outcomes
obtained. Providers, insurers, and consumers are motivated by different
individual and organizational incentives; costs and burdens of patient care
are shifted from one part of the system to another. The result has been a
system that combines exploding costs without concomitant increases in
quality. Healthcare economists and policymakers have reacted by
proposing a number of policies designed to reign in costs without
sacrificing quality. One approach is to focus on the ultimate goal—
improving health outcomes—by measuring those outcomes and
reconfiguring incentives and structures to deliver healthcare in ways that
are both efficacious and efficient. One particular strategy is pay for
performance, under which providers are paid to improve health by
whatever medically-appropriate method they choose. This means providers
are no longer paid for simply doing a given “something” but, rather, are
paid for doing “something effective.”
In this Article, I argue that the criminal justice system is similarly
fragmented, expensive, and inefficient, marked by many of the same
distorted individual and organizational incentives that have plagued health
care. Most significantly, in all but a handful of jurisdictions, states wholly
subsidize commitments to prison—the fee-for-service model of doing
“something”—without tying any of these subsidies to outcomes obtained in
prison. This means prison is paid for even if it is neither effective nor
efficient. These similarities with the healthcare system suggest that an
outcome-oriented, pay-for-performance framework borrowed from
healthcare economics might, if applied to criminal justice, improve its
efficacy and efficiency. I envision this Article as the first of several
applying healthcare economics to criminal justice. It will focus on the
*
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similarities of the two systems, the ways in which an outcome orientation
might provide a useful framework for controlling costs without making
quality subservient, and the suggestion that we begin considering
sentencing choices within that framework.
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INTRODUCTION
Healthcare economists have written extensively about the perverse
incentives of fee-for-service reimbursement, where healthcare providers are
reimbursed for each medical service rendered. Fee-for-service rewards
quantity, not quality—providers get paid for doing something, not for doing
something well. In fact, under fee-for-service, a hospital’s ineffective heart
surgery--or ineffective surgical aftercare--resulting in a patient
rehospitalization could be a financial gain to the hospital despite being a
bad outcome for the patient. The hospital could be paid for the additional
treatments its own ineffectiveness made necessary.
One proposed alternative to fee-for-service is performance-based
reimbursement, where providers are reimbursed based on patient outcomes.
This Article focuses on Professor Michael Porter’s particular framework,
value creation, where value is measured in terms of health care outcomes
per dollar spent.1 Porter’s formulation has the advantage of combining
efficacy and efficiency in a single measure. It measures both whether
something improves health and whether it does so using the fewest
1

Michael E. Porter and Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health
Care, Harv. Bus. Rev. 1, 4 (June 2004).
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resources. Health is promoted without making it subservient to cost
control; value cannot be created simply by saving money if those savings
result in worse health outcomes. Under a value-based system, a hospital is
paid to improve or cure a particular condition, not for any procedure in
particular. In the previous example, if a heart surgery were performed and
the hospital subsequently had to readmit the patient, it would pay the
resulting expenses itself. If the hospital’s doctor performed the surgery
adequately, it would break even or make a little money. But if it treated the
condition effectively through other, lower-cost means besides surgery, it
would keep the surplus itself.
Much of the existing economic analysis of criminal justice has
focused on the economic incentives of criminals, not on the "providers" in
the criminal justice system: law enforcement, prosecutors, correctional
facilities, and probation and parole. Looking at the incentives of providers
in the system might help to explain why the cost and scope of criminal
justice have exploded, the way healthcare costs have exploded under feefor-service reimbursement regimes. As in fee-for-service, criminal justice
providers face few cost constraints on their menu of interventions. The
government subsidizes particular responses, such as prison, in the name of
public safety without demanding evidence that these responses work. Just
as a readmitted patient under fee-for-service imposes no financial hardship
on providers who failed to cure her, so, too, does a recidivist impose no
financial losses on the institutions that fail to reform him. On the contrary,
prison budgets tend to get bigger as prison populations increase, even when
those increases are the result of ineffective (or non-existent) rehabilitation
programs. Given these similarities, perhaps it is time to consider replacing
our existing subsidy-for-service criminal justice approach with funding
based on performance.
I intend for this Article to be both a thought experiment about how
criminal justice might be funded and a potentially useful source of lessons
for those interested in reforming the system. Defining health outcomes is
an ongoing process that has encountered political, organizational, and
theoretical obstacles. Getting constituencies to agree on measures, getting
organizations to implement them, and even deciding what health means and
which data are best associated with it has been long and difficult—and yet
progress has been made. I do not, in any way, mean to suggest that building
an outcome-based system of criminal justice centered around improving
public safety will be any easier or quicker. But I also know that health
outcomes were once seen as impossibly and hopelessly vague, while now
they are utilized in funding health care. In this Article, I will not—and
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could not—come up with precise, operational definitions of public safety
that will apply to all or even most situations. At the very least, imposing a
standard by fiat would fail to get the practitioner buy-in necessary to make
an outcome orientation work. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned
from the health care experience, and the framework has clear benefits.
This Article builds on work—including some of my own—about the
decentralized nature of criminal justice and the concomitant cost-passing
and externalities among criminal justice agencies. It suggests new ways to
harmonize social welfare with the welfare of individual organizations.2 The
main thrust of the argument is to actually give weight to the invocation of
public safety by making sure that what criminal justice agencies are doing is
improving public safety in the most resource-efficient way. This means that
the least-expensive alternative that gets the same public safety result should
be adopted, or else those who decide to pursue other options will have to
foot the bill. One can readily imagine situations that would result in policy
changes—for example, elderly prisoners who have already “aged out” of
crime would be more likely to be released, because keeping them in prison
is both expensive and unnecessary to protect the public. What is different
about the approach presented in this Article is that sensible policies would
be more than just hortatory—I propose changing funding and financial
incentives so that organizations must adopt programs that are both
efficacious and efficient.
The approach taken here differs from my prior work in the way it
treats incarceration. At the time of sentencing, prison is almost always
treated as an undifferentiated mass. I propose instead that prison and other
dispositions in a given system be decommodified, and that individual
institutions begin to specialize in various subpopulations in order to treat
people with various risks and needs. This means that a system would no
longer consider that “prison” and “jail” are fungible, where all prison time
is essentially the same and where sentencing is just an assignment to be
“treated” generally. Instead, sentences would be tailored to individual
needs, with individual treatment programs in individual institutions. This
would move beyond the current conception of “tailoring” sentences, which,
at most, considers only how much time in a generic prison an offender
should get.
In short, and perhaps unsurprisingly, a trip through the healthcare
economics literature has convinced me that it is time for a full return to the
2

See Part III, infra.
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medical model of sentencing, but with better science, better data, and
economic incentives and budgetary feedback loops to aid in the uptake.
The science is much more advanced than it was during the prior heydays of
the medical treatment model in the mid-19th and -20th centuries,3 and even
though it is perhaps not as clearly established as, say, the science supporting
the existence of global warming, the evidence about effective programs is
certainly better established than claims that an X-plus-two year determinate
sentence will deter someone from impersonating a police officer more than
an X-year sentence will.
At the outset, there are some obvious limitations to the subsequent
analysis. First, this Article takes a utilitarian point of view. I make no
initial claims about whether this model helps or hinders the goals of
retribution, nor am I (or even could I) attempt to make retribution subject to
any kind of scientific or evidence-based analysis. The analysis simply
focuses on how we would design a system around treatment as a means to
improve public safety. Second, I do not assume that “nothing works” in
rehabilitating criminals, a phrase often attributed to Robert Martinson, albeit
one he did not write.4 Having said that, I am not a criminologist and will
not do any independent analysis of any of the research cited. Instead, the
Article is concerned with how to improve the uptake of the most robust and
promising approaches to offender treatment, whatever they may be. Just as
medical techniques continue to improve, so, too, will the treatment of
offenders. A system that encourages the development and dissemination of
the most effective programs need not be locked into a particular theory or
method. Third, this Article assumes that data is better than intuition about
“what is right” or “what works”, and since people often make claims about
what criminal justice is or does or how the justice-involved anticipate or
react to it, I want to test these claims with the best techniques we have, even
if they are not infallible. Finally, I recognize that much of this approach
might be inconsistent with the idea that American criminal justice is
adversarial. However, given that at least 95 percent of cases are resolved by
plea bargain,5 I see adversarialism as operating mostly in the breach.
Criminal law as it is actually practiced is mostly about negotiation and
3

See Part III, infra.
Robert Martinson, What works? Questions and answers about prison reform. 35 the
Public Interest 22 (1974). For a discussion of Martinson’s legacy and a rejoinder to the
idea that “nothing works” is still the criminological state of the art, see Francis T. Cullen et.
al, Nothing Works Revisited: Deconstructing Farabee’s Rethinking Rehabilitation, 4
Victims and Offenders 101, 103 (2009).
5
See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov.
20, 2014) (estimating that 95 percent of state felony cases are resolved by plea, and citing
statistics that 97 percent of federal cases are resolved by plea).
4
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collaboration.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the similarities
between the healthcare and criminal justice systems, emphasizing how each
tends to promote overuse, not effective and efficient use. Part II briefly
summarizes what value-based healthcare economics is and how it promises
to control costs in healthcare without sacrificing health outcomes. Part III
sketches out the ways in which a focus on value provides new possibilities
for a law and economics analysis of criminal justice systems, while building
on the policy and analytical work already being done. Part IV lays out
possible new models for the funding and administration of criminal justice,
building on some of my own prior work as well as that of others. Part V
anticipates some criticisms of this approach and attempts to address them.
Throughout the Article I focus only on the ways in which existing
treatment could be made more effective. Healthcare economics has also
pointed out another valuable lesson: that prevention is much more efficient
than treatment. A future article will explore the prevention model and draw
heavily on work being done in criminal justice cost-benefit analysis by the
Washington State Institute for Public Policy, the Justice Reinvestment
Initiative, and others.6 A third article will explore how both treatment and
prevention initiatives might be combined to retool the juvenile justice
system. The ultimate goal of this project is to outline a research agenda that
might be useful for others to use as they seek to improve the administration
of criminal justice. I know I do not have all the answers; I simply hope to
identify some of the important questions.
I. A TALE OF TWO SYSTEMS

The model of medical care provision and reimbursement in the
United States after World War II is notable for its complexity, perverse
incentives, and uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is nothing
logically or legally necessary about it. Universal healthcare was considered
and rejected during the New Deal due to opposition from the American
Medical Association (among other factors).7 Employer-provided health
insurance filled the gap, gained traction as the federal government froze
private-sector wages but not private-sector benefits (including health
benefits), and became solidified with favorable tax treatment after the war.8
6

See Part III, infra.
David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—
Origins and Implications, 355 N.E. J. of Medicine 1:82, 83 (July 6, 2006).
8
Id. at 83-84.
7
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The healthcare “system” that resulted was far from systematic in terms of
who pays and who is paid. It is a complex amalgamation of governmentrun and private for-profit and non-profit providers, paid for by private and
public health insurance (the latter starting with Medicaid and Medicare),
with independent doctors, practice groups, HMO’s and PPO’s.9 Different
parts of the system have coordination problems across health provider and
insurance networks, specialists, emergency medicine, long-term care, and
the like. There has always been a need for more data—and more incentives
to study that data—on what works. Doctors are not necessarily expected to
get feedback about what eventually happens to their patients because those
problems are often passed on to other “downstream” institutions and
doctors.
Fee-for-service reimbursement was, until recently, the dominant
system for reimbursing healthcare providers. Fee-for-service pays
providers per procedure—whether a doctor’s visit, MRI, blood test, or other
procedure—as long as it follows generally established protocols. The
problem with fee-for-service is that it incentivizes additional procedures and
interventions.10 Providers are paid for doing something whether or not it
leads to demonstrated improvements. Even as health is invoked, there is
little financial pressure to improve health, since reimbursements are not
made on that basis. In other words, providers aren’t paid for doing
something that works, just for doing something at all—and, in fact,
sometimes more interventions result in worse outcomes.11 It is hard to
control costs under this system: one critic described the “perverse
incentives” in the U.S. healthcare system as “producing what they are
designed to deliver: cost inflation, inefficiency, and inequity.”12

9

Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-for-Service, The Atlantic (May 7, 2012),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-forservice/256755/.
10
Hendrik Schmitz, Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians—The effect of
a rumeration system reform on health care utilization, 32 J. Health. Econ. 1240 (2013)
(“this literature mainly finds that doctors provide more services in fee-for-service
systems….”).
11
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Are Good Doctors Bad for Your Health?”, New York Times,
Nov. 21, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/opinion/sunday/are-gooddoctors-bad-for-your-health.html?_r=0. For the systemic effects of overprescribing
antibiotics, see Sarah Childress, Dr. Arjun Srinivasan: We’ve Reached ‘the End of
Antibiotics,
Period,’”
Oct.
22,
2013,
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/dr-arjun-srinivasan-weve-reached-the-end-ofantibiotics-period/.
12
Alan Maynard, “Heath Reform: Reinventing the Wheel,” Oct. 12, 2006, available at
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/12/health-reform-reinventing-the-wheel/.

8

PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PRISONS

DRAFT 4/16

Under the fee-for-service system, participants have incentives at
odds with each other. Consumers want health care but do not bear the full
cost of consuming it (even with co-payments).13 Providers are paid per
service, giving them no financial disincentives to do less or even to know
what a procedure costs. Insurers cover the costs that result, but they have
no real control over them. The result is that costs balloon. There is little
investment on the front end of prevention, there is rationing of one kind or
another (price or services offered), and the drive to cut costs is met with
justifiable resistance by a population that views health as at least extremely
important, if not a right. One of the enduring questions is which group—if
any—is steering the ship, and for whose benefit. Is the ultimate consumer
or decision-maker the insurer, who pays? The doctor, who treats? The
person, who is healed? Society, who is made safe from communicable
diseases?
It is well known that the U.S. system is exceptional (although not in
a good way), and the country has recently made significant changes under
the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). But all along attempts to change the
system have been met with fierce resistance by insiders who fear lost rents
or lost discretion to treat patients as they see fit.14 In many instances, the
very idea that medical care could be subject to cost effectiveness analysis
by outsiders was rejected. Only doctors knew what was medically
necessary, and they had to be given complete freedom to pursue what was
best for the patient.
The model of criminal justice provision and reimbursement in the
United States is also notable for its complexity, perverse incentives, and
uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is nothing logically or
legally necessary about it. States did not originally pay for prisons, and
there were no state prisons at the time of the founding.15 The economics of
prison provision used to be different: governments got (or at least thought
13

For a suitably consumer-focused treatment of the problem, see Leslie Goldman,
“How Much is This Gonna Cost Me, Doc?” O: the Oprah Magazine (July 2015), available
at http://www.lesliegoldmanwrites.com/pdfs/cost.pdf.
14
See, generally, Paul Starr, the Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982)
(doctor resistance generally, 23-28, within the progressive era, 253, during the New Deal,
271, introducing “socialized medicine,” 280). For a shorter treatment of the topic, see, e.g.,
Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts, “It’s the Institutions, Stupid! Why Comprehensive National
Health Insurance Always Fails in America”, 20 J. Health. Policy, Pol’y and Law 329
(1995) (identifying structural reasons in the U.S. political system as well as resistance from
medical professionals).
15
This treatment largely reproduces that in a prior article, W. David Ball, Why State
Prisons? 33 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 75 (2014).
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they would get) revenues from prison labor and this meant that control over
carceral populations was an economic benefit, not a loss. State-provided
prisons became the norm under different economic circumstances and
remained even when the value of prison labor vanished. The criminal
justice “system” that resulted was far from systematic in terms of who pays
for it and who controls access to it. It is a complex amalgamation of
government-run and private for-profit prisons, local jails, and treatment
facilities, paid for by state, local, and federal funds. Each part of the system
has effects on the workload and efficiency of other parts but there is little
coordination among them (with the exception of the few states with unified
corrections systems). If prisons do a good job rehabilitating, that will be
less work for police. If police arrest marginal criminals, that will place
more stress on courts and jails. The system as a whole passes costs and
burdens and fails, in many cases, to treat the offender in a consistent and
coordinated manner. There is little data—and too few incentives to study
data—on what works. DA’s and judges are under no pressure to get
feedback about what eventually happens to criminals in their cases because
those problems are passed on to other “downstream” institutions and
practitioners. Even as public safety is invoked, there is little financial
pressure to improve public safety, since reimbursements are not made on
that basis (though there is some political pressure, an element of the
equation discussed at length in the literature).
Under the prison subsidy system, participants have incentives at
odds with each other. Local taxpayers want public safety but do not bear
the full cost of consuming prison beds (even though they pay for police and,
sometimes, local courts). The same is true of District Attorneys and
judges: except in states like Missouri,16 they are not required to consider the
cost of sentencing outcomes, and in no case must they systematically
consider whether the cost paid is either an efficient or efficacious use of
resources. The value of prison is assumed to be greater than zero, but the
costs are not borne by the local officials whose decisions drive prison
admissions. More interventions or prison time does not always improve
criminal justice outcomes—they can make them worse.17 The state
government covers the prison costs that result, but it has little control over
prison utilization (in part because the legislature continually expands the
penal code, as William Stuntz has observed).18 The result is that costs
16

Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri's Experiment, 77 Mo. L. Rev.
391 (2012).
17
Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Johnson, & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce
Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 Pris. J. 48S, 50-51S (2011).
18
William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505,
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balloon. There is too little investment on the front end of prevention, there
is rationing of one kind or another (overcrowding or conditions of
confinement), but the drive to cut costs is met with justifiable resistance by
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment. One of the enduring questions is which group—if
any—is steering the ship, and for whose benefit. Is the ultimate consumer
or decision-maker the citizen, who pays? The DA or judge, who charges
and sentences? The inmate, who is incarcerated? The public, who is made
safe from crime? The legislature, who writes expansive penal codes?
It is well-known that the U.S. penal system is exceptional, and not in
a good way. As with medicine, attempts to change the system have been
met with fierce resistance by insiders who fear lost rents (such as prison
guards) or lost discretion to treat crime as they see fit. In many instances,
the very idea that criminal law could be subject to cost effectiveness
analysis by outsiders is rejected. Only prosecutors know what is best for
public safety, and they need to be given complete freedom to pursue what is
best for society. The myth of our criminal justice system is like the myth of
the heroic doctor doing everything she can for her patients in each case: we
do not use the full complement of criminal procedures outlined in the Bill of
Rights and the system fails as much as it succeeds. DA’s are, in many
ways, the entire system, able to charge under expansive penal codes and
drive bargains; John Pfaff has made a convincing argument that changes in
prosecutorial charging patterns helped drive increases in incarceration.19
To say that the criminal justice and healthcare systems are similar is
not to say that crime and disease are similar (though perhaps contagious
diseases and crime waves are not so far apart). But one need not address
crime when one is talking about incarceration: crime is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for incarceration.20 Crime goes unreported, unsolved,
and unprosecuted. Although poor health also goes undetected,
undiagnosed, and untreated, crime is much more a result of human
agency—choices about activities to engage in that are criminal as well as
choices about which activities will be made criminal—than is disease
519 (2001–2002).
19
John Pfaff, the Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev.
1239 (2010). See also Daniel P. Kessler and Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role of Discretion
in the Criminal Justice System, 14 J. of L., Econ. & Org. 256 (1998) (examining sentencing
evidence in California to conclude that prosecutors seek to maximize prosecution).
20
See, e.g., W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): How Violent Crime
Does Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates - And Why it Should, 28 Ga. St.
L. Rev. 987 (2012) (reported crime rates in California counties explain only 3 percent of
the variance in in new felon admissions).
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(although some lifestyle choices, such as smoking, increase risks of disease
and some conditions, such as female hysteria in the first half of the 20th
century, were products of which behaviors were deemed “sick”). There is
a mental model that crime is a deed, disease is a thing. Ultimately, the way
we choose to treat crime depends in part on our diagnosis of it—but
diagnosis and treatment operate in a virtuous circle. Our understanding of
disease is driven in part by what is successful in treating it, and our ability
to design successful treatments is similarly affected by our understanding of
disease. So perhaps the reason we treat crime differently from disease is
that our treatment models have yielded so few insights. We are still in the
“four humours” stage of our understanding.
II. THE VALUE CREATION MODEL
Fee-for-service has been challenged by pay-for-performance, a term
that describes a system in which providers are paid for improving health
outcomes by whatever means the provider chooses. Providers are no longer
paid by the procedure, but by the case. This, in theory, improves efficiency,
and one recent study found that “financial incentives significantly influence
physicians’ supply of health care”21 and that value based payments “hold
the promise of curbing costs without jeopardizing quality.”22 These
incentives are designed so that doctors will only order those interventions
that are, at the margin, necessary to treat the patient. Doctors should be less
inclined to order interventions than under fee-for-service, which reimburses
the interventions even if they are not demonstrably tied to the outcome.
Pay-for-performance is part of a very long project that is still very much
in progress, a project that seeks to improve the quality of doctors and their
treatments.23 Part of the explanation for the time consumed is that both the
healthcare system and disease itself are complex, and measuring quality and
outcomes is difficult. Part of the explanation is that it is also very difficult
to make major changes in the healthcare system without running into
intense opposition from doctors and other players in the system—a problem
that would certainly also be true of attempts to change criminal justice
along the lines proposed. Pay-for-performance has built on earlier attempts
21

Jeffrey Clemens and Joshua D. Gottleib, Do Physicians’ Financial Incentives Affect
Medical Treatment and Patient Health?”, 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 1320 (2014), PAGE 18
[NOTE: this is not the final pagination].
22
Id. at 19.
23
For a recent history that focuses on the beginning of the quality movement in the
1980’s, using a framework that, like this Article, combines economics and “what works”
and ultimately employs a “value-for-money competition”, see Alain C. Enthoven, The
History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12 Health Affairs 24 (1993).
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to standardize medical treatment, measure quality of care, and audit
providers and institutions.24 This has all been part of the professionalization
of medicine so meticulously detailed in Paul Starr’s the Social
Transformation of American Medicine.25 Pay-for-performance has also
proceeded in parallel with certain structural changes, such as the creation of
HMO’s, which seek to save money by focusing on prevention, coordinating
care, and internalizing inter-departmental externalities. These structural
changes will be addressed in a subsequent Article.
Though quality improvements have been taking place at least since
the 1870s, with reforms to medical education and the re-imposition of
licenses for doctors, one early example of the recent pay-for-performance
trend is the emergence of Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs). DRGs classify
patient conditions and tie them to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.
If a patient needs a hip replaced, for example, his treatment is billed
according to that DRG, and the provider is paid a set amount to treat the
condition. DRGs give providers incentives in the average case to follow
some form of the state of the art, on which the DRG payment is based,
while simultaneously offering incentives to adopt new techniques that are as
effective but cheaper, in order to save the difference between the cost of the
procedure and the amount of reimbursement.
In a series of articles26 and a book,27 Michael Porter (and,
occasionally, co-authors) refined the idea of pay-for-performance in a
particular way, identifying the key problem in health care as a lack of value
creation. He criticized some pay-for-performance schemes as encouraging
cost control without necessarily maintaining health. A provider reimbursed
for a DRG procedure might cut corners, not just costs. Porter’s contribution
is to define value as health outcomes obtained per unit of cost spent. Value
24

Malpractice cases have already created some penalties for grossly substandard
quality. The focus of this Article is on incentives to improve quality. The Eighth
Amendment, like malpractice, penalizes grossly substandard interventions. For the most
influential early theoretical work on quality in healthcare, see Avedis Donabedian,
Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care, 44 Millbank Mem. Fund Q. 166 (1966).
25
Paul Starr, the Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982).
26
See, e.g., Michael E. Porter and Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining
Competition in Health Care, Harv. Bus. Rev. 1 (June 2004); Michael E. Porter, “A Strategy
for Health Care Reform—Toward a Value-Based System,” 361 N.E. J. of Medicine 109
(2009); Michael E. Porter, What is Value in Health Care?, 363 N.E. J. of Medicine 2477
(2010); Robert S. Kaplan and Michael E. Porter, “The Big Idea: How to Solve the Cost
Crisis in Health Care,” Harv. Bus. Rev. (Sept. 2011); Michael E. Porter and Thomas E.
Lee, “The Strategy That Will Fix Health Care,” Harv. Bus. Rev. (October 2013).
27
Michael E. Porter and Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Health Care:
Creating Value-Based Competition on Results (2006).
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is created only when patients get healthier and/or costs decrease. Porter is
not the only one to have latched on to this idea—the Jackson Hole
Initiatives, for example, also proposed accountability on health outcomes
and cost28—but I prefer his formulation because it combines efficacy and
efficiency in a concise phrase. One cannot focus only on outcomes or
cost—one must focus on both. As with the mainstream of pay-forperformance advocates, Porter diagnosed the problem with fee-for-service
as incentivizing individual organizations to maximize their own
reimbursements and/or pass costs on to others without improving patient
outcomes. Porter argued that the healthcare system should promote the
creation of real value in the system, as opposed to revenues or cost-cutting
in particular parts of it, by focusing on how the patient did from beginning
to end, even if she passed from one doctor in one department to another
doctor (or several others).
The value concept rejects a simple focus on cost cutting, because if
cost cutting comes at the expense of health outcomes, no value is added.
Cost-cutting at the expense of health simply shifts costs to another part of
the system. On the other hand, value is created when a cheaper method
produces similar or better outcomes. The incentives built in to the system—
the “pay” in pay-for-performance—mean that evidence-based ideas, ones
that can demonstrate real improvements in health outcome, are favored. It
also means that improvements can be disseminated more rapidly because
there is a disincentive to continue business as usual. Porter’s value concept,
then, is compatible with and an improvement on pay-for-performance. It
simply defines performance to include efficacy and efficiency.
At its most radical, pay-for-performance calls for a restructuring of the
healthcare system; at the other end of the spectrum, pay-for-performance
simply encourages existing procedures to be done more effectively and
efficiently. There is still considerable autonomy within the system for
doctors to pursue different treatments—and the incentives are either in
terms of doing what will make a patient healthier or as healthy at a lower
cost.29
28

Paul M. Ellwood, Alain C. Enthoven, and Lynn Etheridge, “The Jackson Hole
Initiatives for a Twenty-First Century American Health Care System,” 1 Health Econ. 149
(1992). See also Randall P. Ellis and Thomas G. McGuire, “Provider Behavior Under
Prospective Reimbursement,” 5 J. Health Econ. 129 (1986) (concluding that a mixed lump
sum and fee for service system would encourage better outcomes while controlling costs).
29
Indeed, one pair of doctors wrote to endorse the Affordable Care Act on the basis
that it might enhance physician autonomy. Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Steven D. Pearson,
Physician Autonomy and Health Care Reform, 307 JAMA 367 (Jan. 25, 2012).
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There are several different ways to implement pay for performance
models.30 Some focus on particular treatments, some on institutions, and
some on overall allocation of resources to maximize social welfare by, e.g.,
focusing on prevention instead of treatment in the emergency room. All of
these, again, are compatible with Porter’s theories, since he merely provides
a definition of performance (value) that can be used in pay for performance.
One pay-for-performance scheme that has recently been deployed is
readmission penalties for certain procedures: the heart surgery example
mentioned in the introduction.31 Hospitals get reduced payments for
excessive readmissions following heart attacks, heart failure, and
pneumonia. Excessive readmissions are defined as the risk-adjusted rate of
readmission within 30 days relative to the national average.32 A hospital
now has an incentive to promote surgical aftercare, a patient-outcomecentered approach that will lead to better results without incurring
additional expensive hospital stays.33 These bonuses are a net gain to all
parties: the patient is healthier and the cost savings can potentially be split
between the government and the provider.
A second scheme is to pay for chronic conditions that can’t be
cured, such as diabetes.34 The outcomes evaluated here include
management of symptoms, quality of life, survival times, and cost of
treatment. These two separate types of performance-based programs deal
with different types of cases and employ different incentives and metrics.
The goal with hospitalization is health; the goal with chronic conditions is
30

For a general overview, see Meredith B. Rosenthal, “Beyond Pay for Performance—
Emerging Models of Provider-Payment Reform,” 359 N.E. J. Med. 1197 (2008).
31
Hospital readmissions among Medicare patients are both “prevalent and costly.”
Stephen F. Jencks et. al, Rehospitalizations Among Patients in the Medicare Fee-forService Program, 360 N.E. J. Med. 1418 (Apr. 2, 2009).
32
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Readmissions Reduction Program,
available
at
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-servicepayment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissions-reduction-program.html.
33
Another scheme is paying lump sums to manage a general population of patients
(the Accountable Care Organization model). Providers are paid bonuses if they are able to
treat these populations at a lower cost than public medical programs would have,
presumably by promoting prevention over responsive treatment. Since this is more aligned
with prevention and restructuring, I will not discuss it in detail. See, e.g., Alison Ritchie et.
al, “Shifting reimbursement models: The risks and rewards for primary care,” Apr. 8, 2014,
available
at
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medicaleconomics/content/tags/aca/shifting-reimbursement-models-risks-and-rewards-primarycare?page=full.
34
For a study that evaluated long-term care for co-morbid chronic conditions, see Wayne J.
Katon et. al, Collaborative Care for Patients with Depression and Chronic Illnesses, 363 N.
E. J. Med. 2611 (Dec. 30, 2010).
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maintaining quality of life (or slowing its decline). One has easy to
measure outcomes (readmission within a certain time), the other does not
(quality of life per unit of cost). This points out an operational problem
with pay-for-performance. The goal of measuring and rewarding value for
money can be the same, but the means of getting there are often different.
While this vagueness is undoubtedly a weakness when viewed from
one perspective, it also, like many legal terms (e.g., “reasonable”), has the
advantage of being flexible enough to encompass a variety of
circumstances. Different definitions of health will have to be hashed out for
relevant sets of cases. Asking what outcome to measure in a given
circumstance assuredly involves decisions about the particular
measurement, but, crucially, it does not question the importance of
measuring and evaluating itself. The act of negotiating what outcomes to
measure and how—considering the costs of measuring a particular
outcome, the feasibility of measuring that outcome, issues concerning
precision and inter-rater reliability, and the like—cannot be made once and
set permanently for all cases, particularly since those governed by pay-forperformance need to buy into the quality measurements selected or they will
not effectively implement them. There are also issues with co-morbidity—
what counts as a condition? People have more than one disease, and the
treatment for someone suffering from more than one condition is not always
a matter of combining the individual treatments—the regime can change
entirely.
Finally, an outcome-orientation also needs to consider the mechanism of
pay-for-performance and who the target audience for a given incentive is.35
Is it hospitals, as they make their decisions about capital purchases or
staffing of departments? Doctors, as they prescribe treatment? Insurers, as
they decide what to cover and how much to pay for it? Individuals, as they
choose treatments? Pay-for-performance has a wide range of applications,
but it needs to be tailored depending on the constituency. The selling points
are different. Hospitals can free up resources by doing things that are
cheaper but as effective. Insurance companies can improve fiscal health
through lower costs and less need for care as health improves. Individuals
benefit by suffering less. Doctors can have more autonomy. Health care is
a complex system; changing it will play out in complex ways. Having the
goal of improving outcomes per unit of cost spent provides a criterion for
improvement, some kind of yardstick, even if the units of measurement on
that yardstick (mortality, health, time to recover, pain) might be different.
35

Laura A. Petersen et. al, “Does Pay for Performance Improve the Quality of Health
Care?” 145 Annals of Internal Medicine 265 (2006).

16

PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PRISONS

DRAFT 4/16

Any attempt to move towards a pay-for-performance system has
certain prerequisites36 built into it. First, providers need to know
information about cost structure, which involves learning about staff costs,
staff time per intervention, drug costs, and time waiting for rooms to open
up or schedules to align. Providers need to dig deep into their procedures
and understand where potential efficiencies can be exploited. Second,
reimbursement must be based on a standardized measure of health
outcomes. Some of this is definitional on the part of the initial diagnoses—
which hip replacements are garden variety and which present other factors
that will make them either easier or more difficult to treat? Some of this
also depends on the ways in which health outcomes are defined—time to
recovery, pain and suffering, or mortality. Third, outcomes need to be
stored in an apples-to-apples data format for easy comparison across
institutions and patient populations in order to compare the value created by
a particular intervention or institution. Fourth, the healthcare system needs
to move beyond the viewpoint of the provider (whether an institution or a
department within that institution) and take a more holistic approach to the
health of an individual. What combination of action will improve his or her
health the most? This means avoiding cost-shifting from one department or
organization to another and focusing, instead, on the total cost of treatment.
Such a focus might reveal that outpatient procedures are just as effective as
inpatient procedures, or that phone calls rather than nurse visits are effective
forms of aftercare. Finally, some changes might imply new types of
organizations to better treat certain segments of the patient population.
Porter envisages the creation of integrated patient units (IPUs) for the
treatment of certain standard and/or chronic conditions. By specializing in,
say, diabetes, an IPU can develop expertise that should allow it to treat
diabetic patients more efficiently and effectively than a jack-of-all-trades,
master-of-none medical practice could.
There are many criticisms of pay for performance, focusing
primarily on the difficulties of defining and measuring outcomes. Because
these criticisms also apply in a criminal justice context, and because
criminal justice is the focus of this essay, I will address them in Part IVA. I
should also note that Porter’s analysis assumes that there is a market for
medical providers. Even though hospitals employ a mix of for-profit and
non-profit models, they do compete for patients and for insurance dollars.
Porter’s framework assumes that more money can be directed to good
performers and that incentives—both positive and negative—can be given
36

Robert S. Kaplan and Michael E. Porter, “The Big Idea: How to Solve the Cost
Crisis in Health Care,” Harv. Bus. Rev. (Sept. 2011).
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to poor performers. Without a shift in funding and resources, the incentives
available to promote value-creation are limited.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ECONOMICS
The general features of the fee-for-service model map well onto the
criminal justice context, with some obvious modifications, and the
introduction of pay-for-performance models can also be easily adapted to
the criminal justice context. I should note at the outset that the two biggest
growth areas in terms of government spending have been health care and
criminal justice.37 There is very little downward cost pressure in either.38
Also, health care is the centerpiece of the most significant prison case in a
generation, Brown v. Plata.39 Plata, however, is about minimum
standards—avoiding carceral malpractice. The value model goes further, to
incentivize quality and efficiency improvements.
Prison, in particular, is free to local decision-makers, except in
unified corrections systems. No prosecutor or judge ever needs to measure
prison’s efficacy or efficiency, because the system does not demand
evidence of efficacy and a good that is free is perforce efficient from the
consumer’s point of view (even if inefficient from society’s). Providers in
the criminal justice system are not accountable in terms of creating value.
Various parts of the system can get blamed for cost overruns or for
particular outcomes, but the structure and operation of the system as a
whole are seldom blamed. On the contrary: the decentralized nature of
criminal justice practically encourages the shifting of cost and blame. The
prisons blame parole, parole blames the prisons, the county blames the
state, and the state blames the county. There is too much focus on
individual points of the process and parts of the system and not enough on
the way in which a lack of coordination among criminal justice providers is
the rule.
Even where there is some discussion of total costs of interventions,
37

Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington, “The Benefits and Costs of Early
Prevention Compared With Imprisonment: Toward Evidence-Based Policy,” 91 Pris. J.
120S, 123S (2011) [NOTE: this is a citation to a secondary source]. This would, of course,
obviously apply to prison healthcare systems, which are a large source of liability to these
systems.
38
But see Hadar Aviram, Cheap on Crime, for an analysis of the economic downturn
on criminal justice systems. She also points out that this focus on costs could result in
substandard care, a valid complaint about the present system that a value focus would
address.
39
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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these costs do not drive policies. In Missouri, for example, judges are
presented with the costs of various sentencing options, but not their efficacy
or efficiency—the exact kind of misplaced incentives that Porter’s value
formulation seeks to avoid.40 A judge knows that jail is X dollars and
prison is Y dollars, but she does not know which works better—indeed, the
very question would probably either seem strange or be answered with
reference to an individual judge’s experience, a dataset that is rife with
sampling error and a lack of systematic longitudinal analysis. In general,
there is no drive towards efficiency in prison because the cost is not borne
by decision-makers.41 Best practices across jurisdictions and departments
are diffused slowly, if at all. No fire is being lit under criminal justice
organizations, there are no incentives to improve—or, alternatively, there
are incentives to cut costs without improving outcomes. Even if good
policies are deployed, there are no internal institutional incentives to train
people to deploy those policies with fidelity to their design, to follow up
about quality control, and, generally, to ensure that the policies are
implemented well. Those policies are all costs whose external benefits
accrue mostly to other agencies, whose jobs get easier. A prisoner reformed
by prison means more work for prison employees but less work for police.
There are a wide variety of policies “on the ground” even within the
same state, operating under the same set of statutes. There is not
necessarily any convergence within states or across the country. There are
siloed organizations that fail to take into account the externalities—both
positive and negative—of their actions which might either affect public
safety (as in the prison that doesn’t rehabilitate) or affect the budgets of
other organizations (zero tolerance policing leading to an increased
workload in the courts). Claims about deterrence and the effectiveness of
particular sentences are never put to the test, making them essentially empty
claims. The general rule is no data collection, no follow up, no outcome
tracking and no feedback loops to decision-makers such as judges and
DA’s. This means there is little opportunity to learn, little opportunity to
improve, and little accountability. All sentencing is treated as downstream,
someone else’s problem. In fact, many law schools, which train the judges
and prosecutors who drive sentencing and charging, teach nothing about
prisons, even as first year law criminal law classes routinely address the
40

Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri's Experiment, 77 Mo. L. Rev.
391 (2012).
41
See, e.g., Adam Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment
Problem, 40 Ariz. St. L. J. 47 (2008). See also Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in
Prosecution, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 69 (2011) (proposing that the costs of prosecution be made
public but using prosecutorial elections as the mechanism for internalizing the externality).
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purpose of punishment.
Comparing criminal justice and healthcare economics also comports
with a long line of viewing prisons themselves through the lens of medicine.
19th century prison reformers were on board with the centralization of
prisons under state control because they thought it would make them more
professional and rehabilitative.42 Wardens expressly invoked medical
metaphors to advocate on behalf of indeterminate sentences, saying that
they alone knew when an offender was cured. The medical model has
waxed and waned inversely with the punishment model, but the most recent
ascendancy of the medical model was in the mid-20th century around the
time of Williams v. New York.43 This Article proposes a measured return to
the medical model, albeit one that corrects for certain shortcomings. The
historical emphasis on treatment is made with better (but not perfect) social
science and much better ability to crunch the data.
There is a lot of great work being done now that I will not attempt to
reinvent, particularly in terms of measuring the costs and benefits of early
interventions. Criminal justice cost-benefit analysis (CBA) approaches have
received in-depth treatment from a few scholars. Darryl Brown outlined the
approach in 2004, discussing CBA in detail (using, inter alia, environmental
law as a comparison) and concluding, in part, that “offender treatment …
has fared well in cost-benefit analyses.”44 Brown’s analysis is extensive,
analyzing the wide-ranging effects of criminal justice policies, discussing
how prevention is effective and efficient, but his policy prescriptions focus
primarily on how CBA could be incorporated into the executive branch
(prosecution and police). Though he discusses the decentralized nature of
criminal justice, he does not discuss the implications of the prison subsidy,
nor does he advocate pay-for-performance. A recent issue of Criminology
and Public Policy focused on the use of CBA in criminal justice, with
articles by Patricio Dominguez and Steven Raphael (providing a
comprehensive summary of the issue),45 Michael Tonry,46 and Brandon C.
42

For a general background and extensive footnotes to more detailed historical
treatments, see W. David Ball, Why State Prisons? 33 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 75 (2014).
43
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
44
Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 351
(2014).
45
Patricio Dominguez and Steven Raphael, “The Role of Cost-of-Crime Literature in
Bridging the Gap Between Social Science Research and Policy Making,” 14 Criminol. &
Pub. Pol. 589 (2015). The authors are particularly concerned about the way in which the
income levels of rich victims might skew the costs of crime and promote unequitable
distributional effects of resources like police, as well as the methodological problems with
estimating the costs of crime by either the contingent valuation or the willingness to pay
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Welsh and David P. Farrington,47 among others.
Criminal justice CBA approaches are not just theoretical; they have
gained traction in the policy realm as well.48 The Washington State
Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) has long been considered the model
program in terms of evaluating what Porter would call value creation,
analyzing proposed policies in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency.49
WSIPP is now actively distributing its model via a partnership with the
Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative50 and has posted an exhaustive
technical documentation that breaks down exactly how it models costs and
benefits.51 The Vera Institute and the Bureau of Justice Assistance have
also partnered to promote cost-benefit analysis in criminal justice and have
produced a series of extremely informative, practitioner-centered
publications.52 The Justice Reinvestment Initiative of the Bureau of Justice
methods.
46
Michael Tonry, “The Fog Around Cost-of-Crime Studies May Finally Be Clearing:
Prisoners and Their Kids Suffer Too,” 14 Criminol. & Pub. Pol. 653 (2015) (emphasizing
problems with the cost of crime literature, pointing out that the costs of punishment (in
terms of hedonic losses to prisoners and collateral effects on their families) are not included
in some of the most influential cost of crime estimates).
47
Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington, “Monetary Value of Early
Developmental Crime Prevention and Its Policy Significance,” 14 Criminol. & Pub. Pol.
673 (2015) (suggesting that if costs of offending are high, many social welfare programs
will be justified).
48
For an excellent overview, see Cameron McIntosh and Jobina Li, An Introduction to
Economic Analysis in Crime Prevention: the Why, the How, and So What (2012), available
at https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cnmc-nlss/cnmc-nlss-eng.pdf; see also
the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative, “States’ Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis,” (2013),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/pewresultsfirst50s
tatereportpdf.pdf.
49
Steve Aos, Marna Miller, Elizabeth Drake, “Evidence-Based Public Policy Options
to Reduce Future Prison Construction, Criminal Justice Costs, and Crime Rates,” 19 Fed.
Sent. Reptr. 275 (2007).
50
For a report on the New York State experience, see, e.g., Marc Schabses, “Cost
Benefit Analysis for Criminal Justice: Deployment and Initial Application of the Results
First
Cost
Benefit
Model”
(Oct.
2013),
available
at
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/resultsfirst/rftechnical_report_cba1_oct2013.pdf.
51
Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Benefit-cost technical documentation
(Dec.
2015),
available
at
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/TechnicalDocumentation/WsippBenefitCostTechnicalDocument
ation.pdf.
52
See, e.g., Carl Matthies, Advancing the Quality of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Justice
Programs (2014), http://cbkb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Advancing-the-quality-ofCBA.pdf; Carl Matthies and Tina Chiu, Putting a Value on Crime Analysts: Considerations
for
Law
Enforcement
Executives
(2014),
available
at
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Assistance is also working to promote data-driven policies that improve
public safety in a cost-effective manner, taking a holistic approach that
includes all parts of the criminal justice system (redistributing from less
cost-effective programs, like prison, towards more cost-effective programs
dealing with prevention).53 There have also been attempts for private
entities to fund criminal justice improvements using “social impact bonds”,
with payment contingent on successful outcomes.54
There is certainly much to admire in the CBA literature and policy.
What I think is missing, however, is a systematic discussion that goes
beyond the desirability vel non of individual policies and moves towards a
more holistic critique of why diffusion of sensible policies is not more
widespread, and the ways in which the structure of criminal justice—both
institutional and budgetary—might contribute to this problem. I also think
that there is too little attention paid to prisons themselves as potential
sources of improvement.55 The thrust of this Article is not, then, to replace
CBA, but to provide a framework in which prisons and the individuals who
sentence (and charge) offenders have incentives to insist on best practices at
the ground level. CBA will do very little if prison is free to local decisionmakers and they have no incentive to pursue the social good. One
alternative is, of course, to centralize at the state level, but, absent that, an
option that is free to decision-makers will be overused, even if it is socially
inefficient. Ultimately, good policies can only go so far on their merits.
How can the system be structured to encourage wider rollout and diffusion?
Some of the economic literature engages with the incentives faced
within the system by providers of criminal justice. These articles are a
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Vera-CrimeAnalysts.pdf; Christian Henrichson, Using
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Justice Policymaking (2014), available at http://cbkb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Using-Cost-Benefit-Analysis-for-Justice-Policymaking.pdf; and
Christian Henrichson and Joshua Rinaldi, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Justice Policy Toolkit
(2014), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/costbenefit-analysis-justice-policy-toolkit.pdf.
53
Office
of
Justice
Programs,
What
is
JRI?,
available
at
https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestment/what_is_jri.html.
54
Chris Fox and Kevin Albertson, Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds in the
Criminal Justice Sector: New Challenges for the Concept of Evidence-based Policy?
Criminol. & Crim. Justice 1 (2011) (noting advantages of payment by results and
difficulties in determining outcomes).
55
Though Brown discusses the larger framework of criminal justice, including issues
of diffusion, alternative sentencing, and tailoring programs to needs in community
prosecution, his otherwise outstanding Article gives only one paragraph to prison treatment
itself. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 351
(2014). He does discuss alternatives to incarceration later in some detail. Id. at 367-371.
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recent discovery on my part, and many advance the argument that
misalignment is bound to happen when the state subsidizes prison while
local governments control who goes there—an argument that predates the
same analysis from Zimring and Hawkins (the “correctional free lunch”)
that I relied on in earlier articles.56 So, while Zimring and Hawkins coined
the phrase, the idea predates them, and these prior formulations deserve to
be more widely acknowledged in the legal academy. This is my attempt to
correct my own errors in this regard. Many of the arguments discussed
below are summarized in Kenneth Avvio’s excellent 1998 survey of the
economic literature, “The Economics of Prisons.”57
In 1983, Robert Gillespie of the University of Illinois observed the
disjuncture between state payment for prison and local control over who is
sent there, proposing, as his solution to the inevitable overcrowding that
results, that the state instead allocate prison bed spaces to counties and have
locals buy or sell them to other counties as needed.58 Fred Giertz and Peter
Nardulli, also from Illinois, made similar observations in 1985, describing
the “basic misalignment” between local governments who benefit from
prison and the fact that “these services are provided by state government at
virtually a zero cost to localities.”59 They suggested, as I also did recently,
a complete decentralization of the system, where incarceration is provided
by local government and funding is replaced with block grants.60 Nardulli
had earlier developed this idea in 1984, in an article which analyzed county
usage of prisons in Illinois, again starting with the premise that “local
politicians have funded law and order campaigns at state expense.”61
56

Franklin E. Zimring Gordon J. Hawkins, the Scale of Imprisonment (1991). For my
own elaboration on the subject, see W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime):
How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates - And Why it
Should, 28 Ga. St. L. Rev. 987 (2012), W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons, 50 Crim.
L. Bull 1060 (2014), W. David Ball, Why State Prisons? 33 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 75
(2014), and W. David Ball, “A False Idea of Economy”: Costs, Counties, and the Origins
of the California Correctional System, 664Annals Am. Acad. Polit. & Social Sci. 26 (Mar.
2016).
57
Kenneth L. Avvio, “The Economics of Prisons,” 6 Eur. J. of L. and Econ 143
(1998).
58
Robert W. Gillespie, “Allocating Resources to Prison Space: An Economic
Approach Incorporating Efficiency and Equity,” Sep. 1, 1983, available at
https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/29260/allocatingresour977gill.pdf?se
quence=1.
59
J. Fred Giertz and Peter F. Nardulli, “Prison overcrowding,” 46 Public Choice 71
(1985).
60
Id. at 75-77. For my own treatment, see Defunding State Prisons. For a similar
idea, see Chris Fox and Kevin Albertson, “Could economics solve the prison crisis?” 57
Probation J. 263, 277 (2010).
61
Peter F. Nardulli, “The Misalignment of Penal Responsibilities and State Prison
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Alfred Blumstein and Richard Larson, in 1969, analyzed the disjointed
nature of the criminal justice system, remarking that the independence of
agencies inhibited the effective deployment of interdependent policies, and
that criminal justice organizations failed to get feedback about the
downstream effects of those policies on other agencies.62
Some literature has, in fact, focused on criminal justice
performance. In 1993, Charles Logan wrote an article entitled Criminal
Justice Performance Measures for Prisons, but he focused on processes, not
outcomes, and did so from a retributive perspective.63 There is also little
attention paid to the decentralization/organizational incentives problem,
whereby, say, poor rehabilitation by prison might result in increased
workloads for police. Logan’s approach is also typical of the other works
cited here, including my own, in that it assumes that there are no
differences—or no differences that can be measured—in custodial programs
designed to rehabilitate.64 The main gains are from early prevention and
diversion. As I stated in the introduction, this article assumes that there are
better and worse prisons and programs and thus, that prison should be
differentiated as more than simply a locale for incapacitation.
Much of the rest of the economics literature’s focus is on “factors
that affect the supply of criminal activities”—that is, what incentives and
policies tend to make people more or less likely to engage in criminal
activity in the first place.65 This is also true of the most influential analyses
in law and economics. To cite perhaps the most influential example,
Richard Posner’s treatment of the law and economics of criminal law is all
about the supply of crime and the ways in which criminals might respond to
the relative costs of gainful and illicit employment, based on the risks and

Crises: Costs, Consequences, and Corrective Actions,” 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 365, 368
(1984).
62
Alfred Blumstein and Richard Larson, “Models of a Total Criminal Justice System,”
Operations Research 199 (March-April 1969).
63
Charles H. Logan, “Criminal Justice Performance Measures for Prisons,” in
Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System (1993), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pmcjs.pdf.
64
In Defunding State Prisons, for example, the analysis focused on prisons versus jails
and probation. I argued that unless prisons were demonstrably superior, they should not be
subsidized. I did not distinguish among prisons, however, and, for the purposes of the
analysis presented, was agnostic about their capacity to rehabilitate.
65
Richard B. Freeman, “The Economics of Crime,” in Handbook of Labor Economics,
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., vol. 3, 3530, 3541 (1999). See, e.g., Samuel
Cameron, “The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence,” 41
Kyklos 301 (1988).
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rewards of each.66 In so doing, Posner buildt upon Gary Becker’s seminal
1968 article, which itself is also primarily about the economics of criminal
activity.67 Frank Easterbrook also uses the prevention/deterrence model in
his argument that criminal procedures are merely price mechanisms in a
plea bargaining market.68 Both Becker and Posner treat the system as a
passive respondent to homo economicus, rather than something that,
through treatment, could actively alter criminal tendencies one way or
another. Incapacitation is taken as the primary means by which crime can
be controlled, subject to the supply elasticity of other criminals (i.e., as one
exits the market and heads to prison, another enters).69 In general, this
approach is an example of what Thomas Bernard and Robin Engel have
criticized as an overly narrow theoretical approach to the criminal justice
system: too much analysis is bounded by organizational silos, and too little
takes on a broader, system-wide, cross-agency perspective.70
I propose that reformers should combine cost-benefit analysis that
identifies promising programs with organizational incentives to adopt them,
all within the framework of value creation: improving public safety
outcomes per dollar spent.
IV. CREATING VALUE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
What are the ways in which we might restructure the criminal justice
system—or particular parts of the system—in order to create value? In Part
A, I discuss some groundwork that must be laid, both practical and
theoretical, to implement value creation. As stated in the introduction, this
Article is not model legislation ready to be implemented—it is a map into
relatively uncharted territory with only the core defining features sketched
out. In Part B, I focus on particular applications in sentencing that could be
fit into a performance-based system. In Part C, I outline the advantages of
such a system.
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Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” NEED FULL
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Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud.
289 (1983).
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For a law and economics analysis of how crime moves from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction due to enforcement and policy differences, see Doron Teichman, “The Market
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Mich. L. Rev. 1831 (2005).
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A. Measurement Issues, Theoretical and Practical
If the health experience is any indication, the initial move to begin to
categorize similar cases (the criminal equivalent of DRGs) and improve
quality will be a long, iterative process that involves some theoretical work
and a lot of on-the-ground work. In fact, criminal justice might not even be
ready for outcome-based measurements—health care first went through a
series of procedural fixes (qualifications, training, accreditation,
professionalization) from the mid-1850’s to the present that parts of the
criminal justice system might still need.71 Measurements in medicine are
proposed, tested, adopted, refined, and sometimes replaced. The question is
not whether it works in theory, but in practice. Porter, for example, has
been criticized for glossing over the logistical problems of defining and
measuring health outcomes in the real world,72 but Medicare and
commercial insurers recently agreed to common health outcome
measurements.73
The problems in health care have analogues in criminal justice, and I
will only identify them here, not solve them. In criminal justice, the notion
of quality may seem difficult to even get our heads around, even as there is
71
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growing support in general for data collection and evidence-based practices.
Stakeholders will need to gather and figure out what quality treatment of
offenders means and how we will measure it. Again, if healthcare reform is
any indication, the attempt to start to measure and hold accountable certain
members of the criminal justice system will be met with huge pushback
from DA’s, judges, and others at the power centers of today’s criminal
justice system. These definitions cannot be generated by academic fiat. A
careful study of the history of health quality measurements should provide
some insights into the political and organizational dynamics that underlay
the gradual shift. Space and time do not permit me to construct a detailed
history of these changes, but it should certainly be among the top priorities
of a criminal justice performance-based research agenda.
What follows are some problem areas to be addressed. Perhaps they
cannot be resolved at all. But the same has also been said of medicine, and
even if existing measures of health are not perfect or subject to revision,
they are widely accepted enough to be driving policy (and preferable to a
fee-for-service alternative).
One initial observation is that outcomes should be measured across
the system, not in terms of the individual, media-generating case. There
will be failure in the system; that does not mean the system has failed or is a
failure itself. People die of cancer at the best cancer hospitals; so, too,
might we expect some degree of failure with any treatment. This means
shifting the focus to success rates, not individual cases: to how the system is
doing overall and at what cost. The examination of sensational individual
cases too often results in “Never again, no matter what the cost” policies.
The general framework for value creation in criminal justice should
be public safety improvements per cost unit spent. Public safety is often
invoked politically, but, like “health,” it needs to be further defined, with
the understanding that different conditions and treatments will need to be
measured with different metrics. There is a rich literature both in terms of
what should matter (recidivism, desistance from crime, pro-social metrics,
victim impacts) and how to measure it. The healthcare economics
literature, for example, does not have an exclusive focus on a single
measure, but, instead, looks to multiple measures. Porter, for example,
divides health outcomes into three general categories: mortality, recovery,
and health.74 These might be mapped onto recidivism, modality of
74
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treatment, and desistance from crime.
Mortality is the most obvious measure in health; in criminal justice,
that measure is recidivism. Although there is no consensus on what
constitutes recidivism,75 that is another way of saying a variety of measures
could be used, provided they lent themselves to apples-to-apples
comparisons across jurisdictions and/or institutions: arrest for any offense,
rearrest for the same crime, return to prison, and the like. It is an open
question as to which definition is preferable. Is it total desistance from
crime? A reduction in the number of offenses? A reduction in offenses by
each person or an average reduction across populations of similar
offenders? A reduction in the severity of the types of crime (moving from
violent offenses to property offenses)? Reductions which control for certain
variables (aging out)? These choices might depend on the type of offender
or on which garners the most support from practitioners.
The next thing to consider is the modality of treatment through the
lens of efficacy and efficiency. Bentham’s utilitarianism, for example,
explicitly takes the prisoner’s cost (hedonic and otherwise) of punishment
into account, meaning that, ceteris paribus, the least restrictive alternative
that yields the same result is the most welfare-promoting. Prison is
expensive and incurs a variety of collateral harms on a prisoner’s family
(both in terms of criminogenic effects on children and economically, due to
a variety of wealth-extracting contracts for telephones, commissary money,
etc.). Prison might also be criminogenic. If so, it is both inefficient and
ineffective. But, assuming prison “works,” its efficacy might not be enough
to outweigh its inefficiency. These are empirical questions already being
studied. My argument is simply that these questions are important and
should be answered; I am not claiming to have the answers myself.
In the health care realm, Porter suggests that a successful treatment
that is shorter and less painful is more desirable than one that is longer and
more painful. I think this is noncontroversial. The same should be said of
punishment. We should seek to do the least amount necessary to get results,
and we should explicitly consider suffering. I am not, in theory, opposed to
the idea that prison should not be pleasant, but only provided that that
suffering works. If people can stop being criminals as effectively without
suffering, then what is the point of suffering?76
outcome measurement and how to categorize outcomes into a hierarchy.
75
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Finally, where Porter suggests “health” as the ultimate measure, I
would substitute desistance from crime and other pro-social metrics. This
might look different for certain subpopulations—looking at the state of the
art for homeless offenders might mean hospital days avoided or days
without them being assaulted, looking at the mentally ill might involve
medication usage or stability of housing, looking at drug-using offenders
might vary by drug (heroin users might have one set of metrics, meth users
might have another, recidivist DUI offenders might have still others).
Again, the framework states that any criminal justice intervention should
make people better (or the same) for the same amount of resources (or less).
What “better” means depends on political and organizational will, as well as
the state of the art in rehabilitative programming.
There are program and policy implications to choosing what to
measure. These variables must also control for exogenous factors—i.e., a
macroeconomic downturn resulting in higher overall unemployment will
affect ex-offender unemployment, as might sector-specific unemployment
(such as that for unskilled labor). Variables must also consider the full
spectrum of treatment—not just interventions given in prison, but
interventions in community supervision. These variables should be scalar
and avoid the presumption of perfection—measuring better or worse, not
success or failure. Binary measures will, by and large, measure failure,
since most of the justice-involved have below-average skills, economic
endowments, and pro-social networks. We might therefore consider
survival rates before returns to custody (assuming that this is a true measure
of criminal activity, not simply a problem of non-detection—which is also a
confounding variable in medicine).77
It is unlikely that there will be a single metric for every case, but it is
nevertheless important to remind ourselves that public safety should be the
organizing principle. Our theories of punishment involve incapacitation,
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, but these justifications need to be
the effects of hedonic adaptation on the typical prison experience. See, e.g, Jonathan
Masur, John Bronsteen & Christopher Buccafusco, "Retribution and the Experience of
Punishment," 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1463 (2010). My criticism is not with the way suffering is
measured, just with the assumption that suffering itself advances other penological goals
such as deterrence, conveying a message of disapproval, etc. Hedonic adaptation has some
empirical basis; the idea that the rational-expectations hypothesis works for the justiceinvolved, and that the suffering of prison is part of it, has much less.
77
For an example of just such an approach, see Peter Schmidt and Ann Dryden White,
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Econometrics 141 (1989).
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tied to their effects on public safety and measured using common
definitions in common data formats. Proponents of a particular theory
should have a falsifiable theory about why and how their theory (and the
mechanisms that apply to it) works, then measure and test those hypotheses.
Within the concept of value creation, we will avoid cost cutting for its own
sake—as well as stated claims about efficacy that do not consider
efficiency.
Is “public safety value creation” too vague to be useful? Consider
that the focus on value creation is now embedded within the healthcare
policy community. There is substantial agreement that costs and quality
must be considered, and the discussion explicitly references these goals,
even as particular measurements of these goals and means to achieve them
are disputed. The same is not true now of criminal justice. We seldom
consider costs of individual interventions even as we bemoan the costs in
aggregate. We almost never operationalize the idea that prison treatment
programs might meaningfully affect public safety outcomes. At least
agreeing that our criminal justice system should be as effective as possible
for the money we spend on it is, I think, an important step. Most of the
work will not take place at the level of abstraction that “public safety value
creation” implies. It will instead involve meetings with stakeholders,
policymakers, and consumers and will involve much painstaking, granular
work. But having public safety outcomes as a guiding principle will tie
together the many strands of policy and theoretical work currently taking
place. The alternative is to throw up our hands, avoid the difficult work,
and accept a system that few would or could defend as just, effective, and
economical.
B. Value Creating Policies
In this section I will sketch out what policies might arise from a
public safety value creation framework. A few caveats before the
discussion continues. First, this is a framework, not a particular
endorsement of any one metric or program. I am not enough of a social
scientist to engage in that, but, moreover, it is important to be open to new
data and new studies. The principle of measuring, analyzing, and
incentivizing outcome-oriented programs is a procedure: a formula which
isolates the variables but does not necessarily solve for x. Second, the rest
of the discussion will not focus on deterrence or crime avoidance. That is
the subject of my next article. This Article, again, is just about treatment,
not prevention. Finally, I assume that it is possible to know what works,
and also possible that something will work—or at least that something will
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not work as badly as other things or be as bad but cheaper. That is, there
are at least efficiency gains to be had, even if there are not efficacy gains to
be had.
There are also certain conditions that I assume would be built into
the system, as I have noted in prior articles. In an outcome-based system,
localities would be prevented from dumping crime and criminals on other
jurisdictions. Criminals would stay for a period of years in the county of
conviction, at a time horizon appropriate to measure outcomes. (The term
of years would depend on the outcome being measured and, to some extent,
on both the social science and the policy preferences of a jurisdiction about
the costs of monitoring versus the benefits of monitoring.) I also assume
that there would be some kind of validated risk-needs assessment tool used;
both sending and receiving parties would have incentives to do so.
Receiving institutions would not want to take on a harder case—with higher
costs and higher risk of poor outcomes—than they were promised. Sending
institutions would want to ensure that a prisoner received the treatment
needed. This would solve the cream-skimming problem so often seen in the
private prison context. Finally, to the extent that localities were given block
grants to approach crime in the manner of their choosing, these grants
would have to be subject to income adjustment.
A pay-for-performance criminal justice system would first begin
with financial and budgetary reforms that would give decision-makers some
incentives to save money and promote effectiveness. Second, the system
would have to include some relatively non-controversial data collection
requirements that would largely complement initiatives that are already
underway. Third, it would continue with a system that actually tailored
sentences to the risk factors a given offender presented. It would make the
entire menu of sentencing options look a lot like probation does now, with
some attempt to link offender characteristics to penological conditions.
“Probation” is an umbrella term that includes a variety of approaches.
“Prison” or other forms of incarceration should, too. Finally, pay-forperformance might also include indeterminate sentencing, whereby
offenders were released as soon as, but not until, they were “better.” Within
a pay-for-performance framework, however, both prisoners and parole
boards would have specific indicia of readiness to return—whether a
prisoner addressed his or her underlying diagnosis--rather than generic
estimates of threats to society.
First, budgets would have to be revamped along performanceoriented lines. I have previously proposed that states no longer fund prison,
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per se, but that they fund on the basis of crime. This is a potential
restructuring that would enable greater local freedom of choice in how
offenders are treated, but it is not the only way to encourage pay-forperformance. The federal government has less of a financial impact with
criminal justice than it does in medicine: Medicaid and Medicare are
significant enough by themselves to generate change, while JAG78 grants
are not. Still, federal funds could be linked to outcome measurement or
data collection,79 and states could then base funding streams on certain
baseline standards. Depending on the funding approach used, jurisdictions
could conceivably experiment with different approaches to incarceration.
Some might invest in mass lockups to incapacitate—subject to Eighth
Amendment limitations. Others might pay to make people better. This,
too, would provide valuable feedback on the efficacy of various
approaches—approaches which, it should be noted, currently take place at
the intra-state level but which are opaque to voters and officials alike.
Second, the relatively uncontroversial issues that would need to be
implemented to make pay-for-performance viable are, in most cases, issues
that need to be addressed for the system to be effectively managed. This
means collecting data in standard formats, data that includes a sufficiently
long time horizon that is linked to offender behavior in other jurisdictions.
This is not a new idea, and it is one where having the idea is a small part of
the job. Most of the work needs to take place at the institutional and
cultural level, getting buy-in from practitioners and hashing out what those
standard measurements and formats will be. Another uncontroversial issue
would be using current best practices and being open to revising those
individual practices as new best practices develop. Institutions need to
think critically about their current policies, training, and practices. Change
needs to be ongoing and iterative. Those who pay to use these institutions
can tie budgets to best practices, incentivizing the propagation, diffusion,
and experimentation needed. Finally, data needs not only to be collected, it
needs to be analyzed and shared. A judge now, for example, really only
sees the results of her decisions when they fail and an offender returns to
court. Judges should, instead, be educated about how their populations
performed in aggregate, looking at success and failure rates, survival times,
78
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prosocial indicators, and the like for all of those they deal with, not just the
individuals who return to court for an infraction. They should, moreover,
be encouraged to look not just at successes, but whether their successes
came with the minimum effective dose of resources. Medicare initially paid
local jurisdictions to collect data; the criminal justice equivalent would be a
welcome start.
The third issue the system would deal with is tailoring. What is a
DRG for criminal justice? In order to measure the outcomes generated by
the intervention—as opposed to the selection effects of a given
population—we must control for variations in initial condition (which
includes risk). That is, if remuneration is based upon doing a good job, we
have to be able to distinguish between results that stem from a given
population being better than another and a given treatment being better than
another. How do we control for differences between cases and among
populations? Consider the following individual examples. The crime of
arrest might understate the risk a given individual poses—as, for example, a
traffic charge for an organized crime kingpin. The crime of arrest might
overstate the risk an individual poses—as, for example, a battered wife
killing her abusive husband. This is certainly among the thorniest parts of
actuarialism, as making decisions on risk alone can verge on preventive
detention. It is hardly an answer to say that risk assessment tools might at
least do a more accurate job than the clinical, gut-level assessment of judges
and prosecutors. The larger question, though, of what constitutes a
“similar” offense and a “similar” offender is vexing.
In medicine, this, too, is a problem. There is a column in the New
York Times magazine called “Diagnosis” that seeks to diagnose difficult
cases.80 There are biological markers for diseases (though prostate cancer,
for example, might actually be several different diseases81), but other than
DUI there aren’t many for criminal law (and the shameful history of
phrenology suggests that we might be well served to avoid biological
markers). There is also a problem of co-morbidity, where those who suffer
from two or more diseases need to be treated differently, have different
survival rates, and the like.82 This is also a problem in criminal law, given
80
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how many of the justice-involved have mental health or addiction problems.
The issue of how big or how small a DRG should be in order to both have a
large enough sample to be statistically significant and tailored enough to be
meaningful are also present in medicine—see the criticisms of certain
medical protocols as ineffective on the basis of gender or race.83 The
healthcare approach outlines some typical hazards without necessarily
pointing out easy solutions.
Some of the discussion about distinguishing and tailoring has
already taken place in the offense/offender literature and suggests that we
could combine criminal history and offender characteristics (though even
criminal histories can be problematic on disparate impact grounds, as well
as on accuracy and completeness). One place to start would be with regular
risk-needs assessments (RNAs) as a non-exclusive foundation for criminal
justice programming, perhaps adding additional data collection on risk
factors that might potentially be of interest. Best practices for risk-needs
assessments involve re-validation on local populations every couple of
years. One would expect that as data collection and outcome measurement
improve, risk-needs assessment tools would also improve. Risk-needs
assessments have potential problems with disparate impact that need to be
addressed.84 The problems with risk-needs assessments, however, are
dwarfed by the problems with gut decisions of judges and DA’s, which are
even less transparent and accountable—and more subject to bias, explicit or
implicit—than RNA’s.
Tailoring doesn’t just stop with the diagnosis. It also, of course,
includes treatment. This is where the criminal justice system as a whole
should start to look a lot more like probation and diversion. Currently we
do have diversion to probation and treatment, but we also just send people
to “prison”—not different kinds of prisons (those decisions are made by
prison officials during classification) or different kinds of programs (those
are also done by the prison system). Tailoring prison sentencing just means
“more” or “less.” Prison is expensive. We should be considering what we
obstacles/ (noting that “Patients have a nasty habit of having more than one thing wrong
with them” and observing that “multiple chronic conditions account for a disproportionate
share” of Medicare spending); see also Uwe E. Reinhardt, “HEALTH REFORM: Porter
and
Teisberg’s
Utopian
Vision,”
Oct.
10,
2006,
available
at
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/10/health-reform-porter-and-teisbergs-utopian-vision/
(criticizing the idea that medical conditions are easy to identify, discrete, and easy to put
into “a standard, finite life cycle.”).
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get for that money. It doesn’t make sense to say “you are a criminal, you
get prison” the same way it would not make sense for a doctor to say “you
are sick, get medical help.” Doctors diagnose patients with particular
illnesses and prescribe particular treatments. This should be the goal of the
criminal justice system—we should at least scrutinize fee-for-service
subsidies of a treatment that is among the most expensive one we have.
This kind of tailoring would be a radical change—albeit one that was
common during the Williams v. New York era. There are questions of how
much discretion a judge should have to find facts (subject to the underlying
sentencing statutes and whether they, in turn, implicate Apprendi). There
are also issues about whether long sentences would ever generate the kind
of feedback a judge would need—presumably judges would die or retire
before the end of certain extremely long sentences. But surely our currently
broken system which simply enables long sentences with no questions
asked is worse. Not asking questions does not mean such sentences are
more effective or parsimonious; it simply means we have no way to know
whether they are effective or parsimonious.
The value framework could obviously fit into contracts with private
prisons, encouraging a focus not just on cost per prisoner, but paying for
treatment of an offender’s criminogenic needs. Jurisdictions could track
and pay for outcomes, adjusting for the risk profile of those who went in.
The alternative embeds undesirable outcomes. A contract that focuses only
on price, for example, creates incentives for private prisons to “cream skim”
only the most low-cost prisoners, meaning those who are younger,
physically healthier, and less mentally ill. A value creation framework
would adjust the reimbursement price of those prisoners down, making sure
that the outcome is measured in terms of how people changed in prison, not
just how they were upon release. The value framework could also provide
incentives to maximize pro-social outcomes such as educational attainment
in prison85 or longitudinal outcomes such as employment and family
relationships. Without some outcome measurement, contracts that pay a
simple per-prisoner per day amount create a potential incentive not to treat
prisoners in hopes of ensuring a future revenue stream from recidivism.86
Others have suggested different pay-for-performance models, including a
85
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prison re-admission penalty similar to those used in hospitals.87
Beyond the private prison option, the state could also treat existing
state-owned and administered prisons in a similar manner. State prisons
could specialize in particular populations, charging differential rates to
localities based on prisoners’ underlying needs and on the treatments used.
Currently the system does not generally differentiate among the prisons
within the system. But why not make one prison for domestic abusers,
another for addiction-driven behavior, and the like? Programming in prison
can vary: perhaps some will specialize in restorative justice, others with
gang members, others with mentally ill offenders. Prisons can also differ
on the basis of location, size, practitioners and their training, and theory.
Perhaps United States prisons can look internationally for other examples—
Scandinavian prisons approach prisons and prisoners in dramatically
different ways.88 Variety in theory and practice is also a return to the
historical origin of state prisons, when wardens had great leeway to pursue
different methods.
Each prison could focus on needs, and those needs could be
measured, treated, and the treatment assessed in terms of how well it
worked and at what cost. Prisons could subsequently move toward best
practices, nudged, in part, by the demands of those who are paying for
prison beds. No longer would we treat all prisons and all prisoners the
same. Systems would, instead, have some idea of what kind of prison and
what kinds of programs would be in operation once someone got there.
Another option would be for sentence lengths to be limited at the
time they are imposed and potentially extended before release—that is, a
return to indeterminate sentencing (those sentences terminating in parole
release). The problem with indeterminate sentences as they are practiced in
some states like California is that the ultimate length of the sentence is
unlimited: e.g., 25 years to life. There is no incentive for parole boards to
release prisoners; their only incentive is to avoid the spectacular failure, not
to promote the quiet success.89 Other states have maximum limits on
indeterminate sentences (e.g. 4 to 8 years, where release is possible after 4
87
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years but must be done by 8). This would be a return to the medical model
of imprisonment with a few improvements, notably that there was some
understanding of what needs an offender had to address to be eligible for
release (e.g., go to prison and work on your vocational skills or anger
management).
Indeterminate sentences in a system that internalized costs and
benefits would generate pressure to release safer prisoners and avoid the
problem of life sentences “with the possibility of parole, hold the possibility
of parole.”90 Other parts of the system would be clamoring to use the
money spent on incarceration to promote higher value interventions. The
redistribution of funds spent on discretionary years of an indeterminate
sentence could be accomplished through a number of different funding
mechanisms. Payment by a jurisdiction might be for a certain amount of
time for a given condition (X years for a domestic abuser), with the
potential for earlier release (and cost savings to the carceral institution) but
a delayed performance payment based on a certain length of time without
recidivism. States could pay for a given amount of time that amounts to a
valuation of just deserts, and localities could pay for more prison time to
either vindicate local values or to promote treatment—and, of course, they
would be able to shop around for prison beds at particular institutions that
did a good job. Another option would be to localize parole board release
decisions, where individuals from the community decided when a prisoner
was ready to come home, knowing that additional funds would be released
in order either to lower taxes or to redirect funds to prevention programs.
Indeterminate sentencing was criticized in the mid-1970s for a
variety of reasons. I will not address one of the criticisms—that it did not
promote uniformity of punishment—since one of the main advantages to
indeterminate sentencing is the very fact that punishment can be tailored.
The non-uniformity criticisms were, at their core, about racial preferences.
Again, using risk-needs and having an outcome-based approach would
make release decisions less opaque. Parole officials would actually know
what they were looking for in terms of criminogenic needs to be addressed
before release. Prison capitation fees could solve for the problem of
indefinite retention—there would be pressure to let prisoners out in order to
free up funds that could be put to use elsewhere. Indeterminate sentencing
also has the advantage of incentivizing inmates to program. At the very
least, it isn’t as though determinate sentences have been good for prison
population reduction, nor have they proven to be particularly good at
90

W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel, 109 Col. L. Rev. 893, 968 (2009).

DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE

37

reducing recidivism, in promoting equity and fairness, or reducing racial
disparities. As with so much else, the inequality has merely shifted to
differential charging and bargaining capacity.
It is certainly possible that a poorly-administered, poorly-supervised
parole board could impose indefinite detention on the basis of
dangerousness. Our present system already has this problem when it comes
to sex offenders (arguably worse, since the nominally “civil” nature of the
incarceration means that there are no guarantees about the right to counsel
and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof). This is also a
potential reason why retribution could be helpful in imposing some limits,
though I have expressly not taken a retributive approach in this article.
The point here is that implementation could involve a variety of
choices after the sentencing moment in court. It is one thing to have an
imprisonment policy and assume what goes on there is beneficial; it is
another thing to incentivize the kind of treatment that the committing
jurisdiction wants. No longer would an arbitrary, ex ante, one size fits all
term of years be the sentence, with “whatever happens, happens” as the
prescription for those responsible for the prisoner. It would be much more
particular, with specific prescriptions given, not simply “get some drugs or
get some surgery in one of several hospitals”, but “go here and treat your
diabetes with insulin” or “get arthroscopic surgery on your knee from this
doctor.”
There is nothing intrinsic about our current system of imprisonment,
as I have noted in other articles. There is much that might seem speculative
about this approach, but, of course, our system as it stands is huge,
expensive, and a disgrace. Mass incarceration is the experiment; trying to
unwind it is not. Historically, these proposals are much closer to the
sentiments that prevailed in the mid 19th and mid 20th century, minus the
phrenology and other dubious social science. In the mid-19th century, it was
common to pick particular institutions at the time of sentencing, these
institutions were often paid per prisoner, and the institutions had particular
philosophies of rehabilitation. Wardens also wanted to release prisoners on
an indeterminate schedule with the idea that they could keep prisoners until
they were cured. Even if the particular modalities of treatment from this era
are outdated, the idea that one should have a mode of treatment is not. We
know things now. Or, put another way, the “nothing works” philosophy is
misnamed. It should be called “nothing works—except prison” because it
assumes that prison is worth doing even if nothing else is. Phrased that
way, it is apparent that while prison may have something going for it in
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terms of efficacy—though this is disputed—there is tremendous evidence
that it is inefficient.
Criticism of the rehabilitative approach is much like the criticisms
more generally leveled at actuarialism. I am not suggesting that evidencebased practices are immune to some of the harms attributed to them, most
notably disparate impact on people of color—but it can hardly be claimed
that our current system does not have ruinous effects on people of color.
The causes are simply harder to discern with any exactitude, which means
everyone and no one is to blame. That, to me, is not a virtue. The same is
perhaps true of the state of evidence-based rehabilitation. It might not be
perfect, but it is certainly better than what we have now. If I had more faith
in the guts that tell a judge when someone needs prison, or the guts that tell
a lawmaker that a ten-year sentence works better than a five- or eight-year
sentence, then perhaps I would change my tune. I don’t, however, have any
faith in the guts of others (and know not to trust my gut when it tells me to
trust it).91
The current system is both overdetermined and too discretionary. It
is overdetermined in the sense that a given set of years is typically given for
an individual offense, including via mandatory minimums. It is too
discretionary in the sense that charging decisions are beyond review. The
alternative of evidence-based indeterminate sentences keeps discretion but
provides some limits, and it ensures that there is discretion on the back end
of sentencing as well.
C. Potential Advantages of a Value Orientation
There are several potential advantages that might result from a
value-oriented system.
The first is to generate some momentum towards a creation of a
penological state of the art. Measuring outcomes and rewarding value
creation will create incentives for their widespread implementation. Put
another way, why does it take so long for good ideas to diffuse? Why are
there no standard criminological treatments? It could be that there is
insufficient good research, or that local populations are different, but it is
also the case that demonstrably ineffective programs (such as scared
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straight) have not yet been fully eradicated. Again, very little discussion in
the legal academy differentiates among alternative conditions of custody
and programming in prison. The closest widespread practice on the ground
that even approximates this is probation, where judges put conditions on
probationers in an attempt to cure their problems, but even then some
judges think “more is better” without using the risk responsiveness
principle—which might mean more is ineffective—or considering what is
not only effective but efficient, given that public safety resources, like all
other resources, are scarce and need to be deployed wisely. One notable
exception is pretrial statutes in jurisdictions such as the federal system and
New Jersey, which require judges to attach conditions of pretrial release
using the least restrictive means possible.
Tying funding to value creation will incentivize both innovation and
diffusion. Part of the reason that change comes so slowly to criminal justice
in general and prisons in particular is that there’s no incentive to change
(part of it, of course, might also be that retributivism demands it). Prisons
aren’t penalized for doing a bad job. Another problem is loss avoidance—
the hedonic (and economic losses) of prison are not counted, just the
speculative (and non-falsifiable) worry about the next Willie Horton.
Criminal justice costing is certainly doable, as WSIPP and others have
demonstrated, and one can readily think of damages that arise simply from
arrest—namely, for those who cannot make bail, the economic losses from
being in jail until the time of trial (not to mention the increased likelihood
of being sentenced to a harsher penalty). Prisons are a major cost center in
state government, and, as such, should be targeted. We could, of course, do
the same thing via procedure. We could use the speedy trial right, for
example, as a means to cut costs for both defendants and the state
(assuming that the case could be investigated as effectively in a shorter
period of time, which is perhaps doubtful), but that right is consistently
waived. A procedural approach would invite just as much effort without
necessarily improving outcomes.
If budgetary incentives are to be used, one size will not fit all.
Paying for improvements in outcome might be seen as punishing agencies
and institutions that already do things the right way, whereas pay for a
certain standard of performance will be impossible for the lower-performing
agencies and institutions to meet. High performing agencies, then, might be
rewarded for meeting a certain standard, and lower-performing agencies
might be rewarded based on improvement year over year until they meet a
certain minimum, as they currently are under Medicare’s Hospital Value-
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Based Purchasing Program.92 Quality control might even need to start
where medicine did, not with outcomes, but with training, education, and
professional standards. The main lesson, though, is that quality
improvement is a continual process, not a set it and forget it switch.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE APPROACH
Perhaps the most obvious criticism of pay-for-performance is the old
one: that nothing works, and that there is no evidence that one approach to
incarceration and sentencing has better results than another. I have assumed
that there is more than “nothing” that is promising, but I also would argue
that even if there is no good evidence about effective programming, pace
WSIPP, it could be that we have not found the evidence or found the
program. In medicine, too, diagnoses and treatments change and improve
all the time. There are, of course, some legitimate concerns about throwing
one’s lot with science when it comes to criminal law. The experience of
phrenology, eugenics, and race-based theories of criminality demonstrate
the fallibility of the scientific state of the art when viewed by later
generations. I am not suggesting blind faith in experts, but I do not think
this problem is insurmountable.
At the same time, there is some reason to be skeptical that nothing
will be shown to work in the penological context. Is quality in prison really
harder than in medicine? Is it more difficult to research how to treat a
violent person than it is to treat cancer? To improve survival rates of
premature babies? Is it impossible or just not been done—or even really
tried? Do we have an alternative to simply sighing and continuing to
incarcerate, albeit wistfully?
Even if it were true that nothing works, not all equally ineffective
programs cost the same. Some might be cheaper. Moreover, even if
nothing works in terms of making people better, surely some things work at
making them worse. Solitary confinement exacerbates problems with
mental health. It is also extremely expensive. Even if it were true that
being housed in a general prison population didn’t make someone “better”,
it certainly does not damage someone nearly as much as solitary
confinement.
A second criticism is retributive. As stated in the introduction, this
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analysis has assumed an explicitly utilitarian framework. At this point,
though, it is worth discussing whether this approach is consonant with
retribution. I will not belabor the criticisms of retributivism here,93 but will
only suggest that a value orientation is compatible with notions of desert
and redemption. The idea that prisoners can only be warehoused forecloses
any redemption. Rehabilitation humanizes the offender and has the
potential to demonstrate that she is worth saving and redeemable, and
mercy is a part of retribution (albeit one seldom emphasized). Moreover, to
the extent we want punishment to make someone learn a lesson, what better
evidence could we have of that than an offender changing his or her ways?
This is superior to a theory that an offender will (or must) have learned her
lesson because she went to prison; it is, instead, a way of demonstrating that
she actually did. This provides better evidence of the “meaning of
punishment” than claims that are always asserted without proof that the
legislature, judge, or warden meant the message or that it was ever received
as such by the convicted. I would query also whether it is moral to
warehouse people and do nothing for them (particularly given how little
opportunity many of them had to participate meaningfully in society), or to
spend money on prisons and not on schools or other generative endeavors.
Socially, it isn’t at all clear what “values” mass incarceration is promoting,
nor is it clear whether it even aligns with most people’s values. Perhaps it
only aligns with the marginal voter or donor.
A moral concern related to retributivism (but not, strictly speaking, a
part of it) would be that we shouldn’t care about the cost—that justice is
worth any price. Alternatively, it could be argued that rehabilitation is also
worth it no matter the price. These arguments necessarily ignore the fact
that lots of worthwhile things cost money and that money spent on one
thing cannot be spent on another. If we care about victims, what better
tribute to them than to fix someone? If we care about offenders, what better
93
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way to show that than to try to heal them? We are giving up on them
otherwise.
In terms of cutting costs by worsening conditions of confinement,
the value approach is definitively superior. Yes, there is an Eighth
Amendment limit to prison conditions that kicks in several years after a
state like California stipulates that it is violating that portion of the Bill of
Rights (as in Plata). In the meantime, there is a temptation to incarcerate on
the cheap. Not providing programming is likely to make people more
dangerous, in addition to making them bored. The same is likely true for
not feeding prisoners a full 3 meals a day. The value argument does not
replace rights-based arguments, but neither does it contradict them. It
supplements them. Appealing to economic efficiency is a way of expanding
the constituency supporting the unwinding of mass incarceration.
A penultimate objection is that criminals with different social
backgrounds will be punished disproportionately: that diagnoses that take
into account social deficits will just end up punishing the poor. If there are
deficits, why only work on them in prison? With this objection, I agree.
This is why efficacy and efficiency in treatment goes only so far, and why,
ultimately, the wider-ranging reorganization of criminal justice funding will
have to include prevention—which also means it will have to include social
welfare programs that are not traditionally considered public safety
programs but which might, nevertheless, prevent criminal activity. Most
people would surely rather pay to subsidize poor children’s day care than
pay to subsidize poor adults’ prison healthcare. We should have a system
that incentivizes those investments and penalizes the misallocation of
resources. We should not allocate social welfare resources only after crime
and criminals have been generated. This is the argument I will address in
my next article.
At the same time, the current focus on incapacitation offers no way
out. Our existing system is full of poor people and people of color—those
most disadvantaged by society. At least in a pay-for-performance system
there are incentives to treat offenders, incentives for offenders themselves to
get treatment, and incentives to release people when they are ready. Prison
subsidies do none of that.
Finally, regulatory capture by service providers could also
potentially be an issue. The treatment industry is big business—called by
some the “treatment industrial complex”—and if there were a greater uptake
of diversion instead of prison, there could be the potential that treatment
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providers might lobby and skew the distribution of sentencing alternatives.
To this I will only say that prison guards and the prison industry may have
already effectively captured the state’s interest in incarceration, and that
some countervailing interests might serve to rescue the state from its current
captors. Moreover, the value model assumes that data will be collected on
effectiveness and treatment dollars will go only to those providers and
programs that demonstrate efficacy and efficiency. This should serve to
ensure that parties who get more traffic are getting it because they do a
good job.
CONCLUSION
The preceding Article has attempted to lay out a vision for where
criminal justice might go. It has not been intended to be overly conclusive,
nor is the social science necessarily definitive. Instead, I have sought to
introduce a goal-oriented framework into which the latest research and best
practices might fit, in a way that promotes the dissemination and adoption
of those best practices. If it does no more than complement the existing
work being done on criminal justice CBA, it will have done enough.
As I have stated in prior articles, there are many different ways to
structure and fund criminal justice systems, and many different ways have
in fact been employed in the United States, from purely local criminal
justice to unified corrections systems and other systems in between. In this
Article I have proposed another option for us to consider alongside those
alternatives. It is worth remembering that the system that has developed is
historically contingent, not inevitable or constitutionally required.
Moving forward, it is also clear that academic and theoretical
writing are not enough to unwind the carceral state. Policymakers and
practitioners will have to engage with the system at the process level,
working with those in the system to get their perspective, their detailed
knowledge about policies and processes, to get them to buy in, and maybe
even to restructure their own contracts and performance incentives.
There is a natural tendency to dismiss some or all of the preceding
analysis as utopian. Indeed, this is a criticism leveled at Porter’s work: that
it can’t work in real life, that costing is difficult, that there is no state of the
art, that diagnoses are difficult, etc. I would certainly not claim that
restructuring the criminal justice system along the lines I have suggested
would be easy, but it would at least take seriously the idea of public safety
and make it more than a rhetorical device to be invoked every time new
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ground is broken on an unproven, inefficient prison construction project. In
the end, there is nothing to be lost by trying to re-imagine our present
system. Making change happen is always difficult, but making our present
system better—given the very low bar set—is certainly worth the attempt.

